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1 Introduction
Bargaining between rms and workers often takes place in the presence of private in-
formation. As an example, consider a rm that has the opportunity to adopt a new
production technology that is e¤ective only if the rms workers invest in learning how
to use it. The rm is likely to be only incompletely informed about the workerscosts
of making the investment and the workers are likely to be only incompletely informed
about the rms benets of adopting the new technology. The presence of this private
information will hamper the negotiations over the continuation of the employment rela-
tionship and may possibly lead to the rm and the worker separating. In this paper we
analyze the functioning of decentralized labor markets under circumstances like these.
To this end we endogenize separation in a search model of the labor market and allow
for negotiations over separations to take place under private information.
In most existing search models, bargaining between rms and workers takes place
under complete information (see e.g. Pissarides 2000). An important implication of this
assumption is that bargaining is e¢ cient, in that rms and workers instantaneously agree
to form, or continue, employment relationships if there are gains from trade and they
instantaneously agree to separate if there are none. In contrast, as a well-established
literature has shown, if bargaining takes place under asymmetric information the parties
may fail to realize all gains from trade (see Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983, Hall and
Lazear 1984, and Hall 1995).1 Our paper combines the insights of these two literatures.
We present a dynamic randommatching model in which rms post vacancies and workers
search for jobs. We assume that job creation takes place under complete information
(like in Pissarides, 2000) but job destruction may be caused by private information. In
1There is also a large experimental literature that supports the view that agents often fail to reach
e¢ cient agreements (see Kagel and Roth 1997).
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particular, we assume that during the course of their relationship a rm and a worker
may experience productivity shocks and that the cost of the adjustments necessary to
cope with these shocks is private information. As a consequence, wage renegotiation
following productivity shocks may be ine¢ cient and the rm and worker may separate
failing to realize gains from trade (like in Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). Our analysis
of this model provides three main insights.
First, we show that in a labor market in which workers and rms bargain under
asymmetric information, a reduction in the cost of separation (e.g. a ring tax) leads
to an increase in job instability, i.e. in the probability that workers and rms separate
following productivity shocks. The reason for this is that a reduction in separation
costs increases the joint value of the workers and the rmsoutside options and thus
induces them to bargain more aggressively. This, in turn, makes it more likely that rms
and workers will separate following productivity shocks and thus makes employment
relationships more unstable. In this regard it is important to note that, contrary to
what would happen in a model in which workers and rms bargain under complete
information, in our model workers and rms may sometimes separate even when it
would be e¢ cient for them not to do so, i.e. even when their joint expected utility from
continuing the employment relationship is greater than their joint expected utility from
separating and returning to the labor market.
Second, we show that, because separations can be privately ine¢ cient, a reduction
in the cost of separation can make some groups in society and possibly society as a
whole worse o¤ by increasing the probability of separation. To see this, consider
the e¤ect of a reduction in the ring tax that has to be paid whenever a rm and a
worker separate. On the one hand, such a reduction has a direct positive e¤ect on
the worker and the rms expected welfare, because it lowers separation costs when the
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productivity shock is so large that separation is actually privately e¢ cient. On the
other hand, however, precisely because it becomes less costly to separate, the reduction
in the ring tax induces the workers and rms to bargain more aggressively and increases
the probability of privately ine¢ cient separation. This negative e¤ect can dominate
the direct benet of a reduction in ring taxes, with the possible consequence that rms
and workers can be actually made worse o¤ by a reduction in these taxes. Our analysis
allows us to derive precise, and potentially testable, predictions about the conditions
under which di¤erent groups in society are made worse o¤by a labor market reform. In
this respect, our analysis contributes to the literature that seeks to explain why reforms
that reduce labor market frictions have often faced substantial political opposition in
spite of their strong support by institutions such as the OECD and the IMF (see, for
instance, Saint-Paul 2000 and Pissarides 2001).
Third, our analysis contributes to our understanding of contractual arrangements be-
tween rms and workers and of the e¤ects of changes in the labor market environment on
these arrangements. In Section 5 of the paper we endogenize contractual arrangements
between rms and workers and study the e¤ects of changes in the labor market envi-
ronment on these arrangements. Specically, rms and workers often use employment
contracts that make it more costly for them to separate in the future. For instance,
since the mid-1980s rms in Europe have been able to choose between hiring workers
on rigidpermanent contracts for which separation costs are signicant or on exible
xed-term contracts for which they are negligible.2 We provide a novel explanation
for why rms and workers may agree to adopt rigid employment contracts that increase
future separation costs. In particular, we show that rms and workers that anticipate
2The di¢ culty of dismissal is one of three kinds of employment protection listed by the OECD
that increases ring costs but does not involve any transfer from the employer to the employee (see also
Footnote 9 below).
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future bargaining ine¢ ciencies can use these contracts as a means of committing to less
aggressive bargaining behavior and thus stabilizetheir employment relationship. Our
model shows that whether or not rms and workers want to use such contracts for this
purpose depends crucially on the labor market environment and the workersproduc-
tivity. In particular, it shows that a su¢ ciently large reduction in exogenously imposed
separation costs, such as a reduction in ring taxes, leads to a one-o¤ switch from rigid
to exible employment contracts. This endogenous contractual response to exogenous
labor policy changes induces rms and workers to bargain even more aggressively and
thus further destabilizes employment relationships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the
related literature. In Section 3 we present the structure of the model. In Section 4 we
solve the model, taking as given the contractually specied separation costs and discuss
the e¤ects of a reduction in ring taxes. We then endogenize the contractually specied
separation costs in Section 5, check for the robustness of our results in Section 6 and
nally conclude in Section 7. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a number of contributions that have identied di¤erent mech-
anisms through which a reduction in market frictions can be welfare reducing. For
instance, Kranton (1996) and McLaren and Newman (2002) analyze models in which a
reduction in market frictions, by increasing the outside options of agents in a repeated
game setting, can hamper cooperation and potentially reduce welfare, whilst Ramey
and Watson (2001)consider the adverse e¤ects that reductions in market frictions may
have on the investment incentives of agents. A number of papers have identied reasons
why market frictions in the form of employment protections can be welfare enhancing.
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For instance, Saint Paul (1995, 1996) and Fella (2000) have shown that, when rms
rely on e¢ ciency wages to motivate workers, severance payments can mitigate the ten-
dency of the rms to re workers too oftenand, through this channel, increase welfare.
Pissarides (2001) shows that di¤erent kinds of employment protection can serve as in-
surance devices when workers are risk averse and Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) show
that severance payments can increase welfare by providing insurance and reducing r-
ings.3 Our paper is related to these contributions since we show that one consequence of
ine¢ cient bargaining between rms and workers is that an increase in separation costs
can be welfare enhancing.
While the papers discussed above show that severance payments can be welfare
enhancing, less work has been done on whether such payments should be imposed by
the government rather than left to private contracts. This issue is, however, addressed
by Schmitz (2004) who provides a model of employment relationships with asymmetric
information and shows that rms and workers may be better o¤ when the government
imposes employment protections than when these protections are stipulated privately
by the parties. Although the focus of our paper is di¤erent, we also allow for the
possibility of private contracting over employment protection.4
Bargaining under asymmetric information has been analyzed by a large and well-
established literature (see Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere 2002 for an overview). In
a seminal contribution, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) analyze bilateral bargaining
between two agents with private and independent valuations. They show that if trade
is not always e¢ cient and the agents can opt out of the bargaining game after having
3A related literature studies the introduction of xed-term contracts. See Güell (2005) and Alonso-
Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde and Galdon-Sanchez (2004) and the references therein.
4Burguet, Caminal and Matutes (2002) consider private contracting over employment protections
(buy-out fees and severance payments) when the incumbent employer has more information about an
employee than the labor market has.
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learned their valuations, bargaining is necessarily ine¢ cient, that is, the agents will
sometimes fail to realize strictly positive gains from trade. They also characterize the
second best trading mechanism.5 Most of the literature on bilateral bargaining under
private information assumes that agents are risk neutral and we follow the literature in
this respect. An exception is Copic and Ponsati (2006) who consider a setting similar
to that adopted by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and allow for risk aversion by the
traders. They characterize the optimal mechanism under ex post individual rationality
and ex post incentive compatibility. It would be interesting to allow for risk aversion
by the workers in a setting such as ours but we do not address this issue in this paper.
Several recent papers study the consequences of asymmetric information in models
of competitive search (Shimer and Wright 2004, Faig and Jerez 2005, Moen and Rosen
2007). In this literature the closest complementary paper to ours is Guerrieri (2007), who
analyzes a competitive search model in which workers are privately informed about their
disutility of labor and shows that, in a dynamic version of the model, the equilibrium
can be constrained ine¢ cient. Her paper and ours are related since in both papers
the workersendogenous outside options determine their participation constraints and,
through this channel, the cost of information revelation. However, whilst Guerrieri
focuses on the constrained e¢ ciency of a competitive search equilibrium, we focus on the
consequences of ine¢ cient bargaining for job instability and the types of labor contracts
adopted in equilibrium.
Finally, our paper is related to Matouschek and Ramezzana (2007) who develop a
model of a matching market in which buyers and sellers can adopt exclusive contracts
to reduce future bargaining ine¢ ciencies. Although their paper also studies bargaining
ine¢ ciencies in a matching market, it focuses on the search externalities imposed by a
5Williams (1999) extends the results in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to a multilateral setting.
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buyer-seller pair on other buyers and sellers when they adopt exclusive contracts rather
than on the e¤ects of policy reform and contractual choices on the instability of trade
relationships over time like the present paper.
3 The Model
We consider a dynamic market in which time is discrete and runs indenitely. All agents
are risk-neutral and discount the future at rate r.
There are two types of agents: workersand rms. At the beginning of every period
an exogenous and equal number n of new workers and new rms enter the market. Every
worker enters the market as unemployed and searches for a job, while every rm enters
the market with an open vacancy and searches for an employee. In every period in which
a worker is unemployed he receives utility b and in every period in which a rm has an
open vacancy it incurs costs c. Unemployed workers and rms with open vacancies can
decide to leave the market permanently at any point in time and obtain utility equal
to zero for ever. If they instead decide to stay in the market, they are brought together
by a random matching process, that we describe further below. If, after having met, a
rm and a worker decide to start an employment relationship then, in every subsequent
period in which they are still together, the rm produces one unit of a good worth p and
the worker experiences a disutility that, without loss of generality, is set equal to zero.
The workers disutility and the rms marginal product p are common knowledge and
the marginal product is su¢ ciently large to ensure that all employment relationships
are initially formed. The rm and the worker bargain over the wage at the beginning
of their employment relationship and renegotiate it in every period until they separate.
We assume that when wages are negotiated the rm and the worker each make a take-
it-or-leave-it o¤er with probability 1=2. If the o¤er is accepted, production takes place,
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wages are paid and time moves on to the next period. If the o¤er is rejected, the
worker becomes unemployed and receives b, the rm reopens the vacancy and incurs
costs c and time moves on to the next period. Employment relationships are subject to
random shocks that cause the worker and the rm to renegotiate compensation under
private information, as described further below. Furthermore, at the end of every period
a worker (regardless of whether he is employed or not) dies or a position (regardless of
whether it is lled or not) is destroyed with exogenous probability d. In order to preserve
symmetry, we also assume that if a worker dies while being employed the position that
he occupies is also destroyed and, analogously, that if the position who is destroyed is
lled, the worker who occupies it must also leave the market. This implies that the
e¤ective discount rate faced by workers and rms is given by   (1  d)=(1 + r).
Vacancies and unemployed workers are brought together by a random matching
process. In particular, at the beginning of every period the total number of contacts is
given by the matching function M = am(u; v)  minfu; vg, where u and v denote the
number of unemployed workers and of open vacancies, respectively. We assume that this
function is increasing, continuous, and homogeneous of degree one in both arguments;
we also normalize m(1; 1) to unity. Since unemployed workers and open vacancies enter
the market in equal numbers and they only leave the market in pairs, we have that
u = v and thus that M=u = M=v = a. In other words, unemployed workers and rms
with open vacancies nd a counterpart with the same exogenously given probability a.
The parameter a, therefore, captures the e¢ ciency (or Total Factor Productivity) of the
matching process.
The focus of our analysis is on job destruction, which we describe next. At the
beginning of every period existing employment relationships are hit by a shock with
probability . To avoid having to discuss uninteresting cases, we assume that the shock
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does not hit very often, in the sense that  < (1  ) =(2). When an employment
relationship is hit by a shock, the rm and the worker need to decide between mak-
ing a costly adjustment and continuing their relationship or separating. The type of
adjustment that we have in mind is, for instance, a fundamental change in production
technology or a reorganization of the rm. If the adjustment is made, the worker
experiences a one-o¤ disutility  and the rm realizes a, potentially negative, one-o¤
benet : After  and  have been incurred, the rm and the worker can continue their
employment relationship as described above, i.e. they can produce one unit of a good
worth p, after which time moves on to the next period. If the adjustment is not made,
the worker-rm pair becomes unproductive and separates. The workers disutility, , is
drawn from a distribution with cumulative function G() and density function g() on
some compact support  . We denote the inverse of the hazard rate of this distribution
by H()  G()=g() and assume that it is monotonically increasing. Analogously, the
rms realization of  is drawn from a distribution with cumulative function F () and
density function f() on some compact support P. We denote the inverse of the hazard
rate of this distribution by K()  [1 F ()]=f() and assume that it is monotonically
decreasing.6 Our key assumption is that, although the distributions F () and G() are
common knowledge, the realizations  and  are privately observed by the rm and the
worker, respectively. Bargaining over the amount that the rm should pay the worker
for the adjustment is therefore hindered by the presence of private information. To be
consistent with the wage bargaining process in the absence of shocks, we assume that
when a shock occurs the rm and the worker can each make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
with probability 1=2. If this o¤er is accepted, the worker and the rm continue their
6The monotone hazard rate conditions imposed on H() and K() are satised by many common
distributions.
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employment relationship and if it is rejected they separate and return to the search pool.
We also assume that the s and the s are uncorrelated between them and over time.
Finally, we assume that   and P are such that for some realizations of  and  it is
e¢ cient for the rm and the worker to make the adjustment while for other realizations
it is not.7 The timing of the bargaining game is summarized in Figure 1.
Whenever a rm and worker who are currently in an employment relationship sepa-
rate, the rm must bear two types of costs: a ring tax , which is xed exogenously by
the government, and, possibly, a self-imposed cost R 2 [0; R] to which the rm and the
worker commit at the beginning of their employment relationship.8 The upper limit R
is exogenously given. Note that R is not a transfer from the rm to the worker, but
a pure cost that detracts from their joint surplus, e.g. costly legal or administrative
procedures, an amount paid to an escrow fund, a net loss on retirement income, or in-
vestments that are partly specic to the rm worker pair and cannot be fully recovered
by either party.9 As we shall discuss in Section 5, in a world with complete information
agents would always set R = 0 but this is no longer the case under private information.
Having outlined the structure of the model, it is worth briey discussing the reasons
for and the implications of two of our simplifying assumptions. First, we rule out free
entry by rms and focus on a simple model with an exogenous inow of rms which is
equal to the inow of workers. This has the advantage of simplifying the analysis, since
7We are ruling out the uninteresting cases in which it is always e¢ cient to make the adjustment and
in which it is never e¢ cient to do so.
8The results that we derive in this paper would not change if the extra cost R were incurred not
only by the rm but also by the worker.
9Pissarides (2001, page 136) discusses the ve kinds of employment protection listed by the OECD
and argues that three of them (administrative procedures, di¢ culty of dismissal and additional measures
for collective dismissals) appear to be mainly ways of making it di¢ cult for the employer to dismiss
a worker without any apparent immediate nancial gain to the employee.Saint Paul (1995, page 49)
argues that rms can use a technology with costly training and specic investment in human capital
to make it more costly for themselves to re workers in the future. Fella (2000) also allows for the
possibility that the severance payment that a worker receives is less than the amount paid by the rm.
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the market tightness ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers is always unity. It can
be shown, however, that our main results would continue to hold in a version of the
model with free entry, as discussed in Section 4.5. Second, for most of the paper we
assume that workers and rms use a given, simple bargaining game in their negotiations
following a shock. A possible concern with this approach is, however, that our results
may depend on this particular bargaining game, especially in light of the fact that this
is not the most e¢ cient bargaining game that the parties could adopt.10 To address
this concern, in Section 6 we assume that rms and workers adopt the most e¢ cient
bargaining game and show that our qualitative results are una¤ected by the adoption
of this more general framework.
4 Equilibrium without Self-imposed Rigidities
In this section we study the equilibrium of our model in the case in which the rm and
the worker cannot contract over self-imposed rigidities. Thus, for the time being, R is
taken as an exogenous parameter. We solve the model in Sections 4.1-4.3 and analyze
the e¤ect of a fall in the ring tax in Section 4.4.
4.1 Job Creation and Wage Setting
A rm and a worker who are matched rst negotiate an initial wage and then, in case
they agree on a wage and form an employment relationship, renegotiate the wage in
every subsequent period in which they are still together. In this section we consider
wage bargaining between the rm and the worker at the initial hiring stage and in all
subsequent periods in which there is no productivity shock. Note that, in contrast
10The simple bargaining game used in most of the paper is not the most e¢ cient in the sense that
if rms and workers were able to contract over the bargaining game when they form their employment
relationship, they would choose a di¤erent game.
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to the bargaining over the adjustment bonus considered in the next subsection, in this
section wage bargaining always takes place under complete information.
Consider a rm and a worker that have just been matched. If they start an em-
ployment relationship, they can generate a match value Z. If, instead, they return to
the search pool, the worker and the rm realize U and V , respectively, where U is the
workers expected utility when unemployed and V is the expected value of a rm when
it is searching for a worker. Wages are determined by a bargaining game in which the
rm and the worker each make a take-it-or-leave-it wage o¤er with probability 1=2. In
this game it is optimal to o¤er a wage that makes the other party indi¤erent between
accepting and rejecting. Thus, when it is the rm to make an o¤er, it o¤ers a wage
such that the workers lifetime expected utility from being employed by the rm, W , is
equal to U , his expected utility when unemployed. Similarly, when it is the worker to
make an o¤er, he demands a wage such that the rms expected value from employing
the worker, J , is equal to the rms expected value when searching for a worker V . It
then follows that when a rm and a worker are initially matched, the workers lifetime
expected utility is
W0 = U +
1
2
[Z   S0] (1)
and the expected value of the rm is
J0 = V +
1
2
[Z   S0] ; (2)
where
S0  U + V (3)
is the joint value of search if the rm and the worker do not form an employment
relationship.11
11Since the dynamic structure of our model is fairly straightforward, we omit time subscripts through-
out the paper in order to simplify notation.
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Consider next a rm and a worker who are renegotiating the wage in some period
after they formed their employment relationship and in which there has not been any
productivity shock. When it is the rms turn to make the o¤er, it still o¤ers a wage
such that W = U . When it is the workers turn, however, he will now o¤er a wage such
that J = V      R, where  is the ring tax and R the self-imposed rigidities. This
is the case since, once an employment relationship has been formed, the rm can only
return to the search pool and realize J after incurring separation costs equal to (+R).
In every period in which the worker-rm pair has not been hit by a productivity shock,
the workers lifetime expected utility is then given by
W1 = U +
1
2
[Z   S] (4)
and the expected value of the rm is given by
J1 = V    R + 1
2
[Z   S] ; (5)
where S  U + V      R is the joint value of search if the rm and the worker
terminate their employment relationship. Note that when the separation costs are
strictly positive, that is when +R > 0, the value of the rm is higher at the beginning
of the employment relationship than during it, i.e. J0 > J1, while the expected utility
of the worker is higher during an employment relationship than at its beginning, i.e.
W1 > W0. This is the case since, with strictly positive separation costs, the rm is in
a stronger position when it bargains with a new potential worker than when it bargains
with an existing employee. Note, however, that this is only a distributive e¤ect, since
the total match value does not depend on whether the worker and the rm are at the
start or at some later stage of their employment relationship. In particular, using (1)
to (5), we have
W0 + J0 = W1 + J1 = Z: (6)
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The match value Z is given by
Z = p+  [Ze + (1  )Z] ;
where  is the probability that a shock hits and Ze is the expected match value when a
shock hits. Rearranging then gives
Z =
1
1  (1  )(p+ Z
e). (7)
4.2 Job Destruction
Consider now the implications of the model outlined in Section 3 for job destruction.
When the shock occurs, the rm and the worker negotiate over the adjustment bonus 
and these negotiations are hindered by the presence of private information. In particular,
with probability 1=2 the rm makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er without observing the
workers disutility  and with probability 1=2 the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er without observing the rms realization of the adjustment benet .
Suppose rst that the rm makes the o¤er. The worker accepts an o¤er  if and
only if the value of continuing with the current employer is greater than or equal to the
value of search U , i.e. if and only if     +W1  U: Rearranging one obtains that the
worker continues in the job if and only if
  e   +W1   U , (8)
that is, if the adjustment bonus  and the net continuation payo¤W1 U are su¢ ciently
large relative to the adjustment cost .
The rm chooses the bonus  in order to maximize its expected value from the time of
the shock onward, given byG(e) ( +J1)+[1 G(e)](V  R): Since (8) establishes a
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one-to-one relationship between the bonus  o¤ered by the rm and the marginal worker
e who accepts it, in order to solve the rms expected prot maximization problem we
can think of the rm choosing the marginal worker e. Therefore using (8) to substitute
for  and then (6) to substitute Z for (W1 + J1) in the expression for the expected value
of the rm given above, we have that a rm with productivity  solves
maxe G(e) (  e + Z   U) + [1 G(e)] (V    R): (9)
The rst order condition of this problem is
e +H(e) = + Z   S; (10)
for all ; where H() is the inverse of the hazard rate of the distribution of . Equation
(10) implies that e is a function of , although we do not make this explicit in the
notation.
Suppose now that the worker makes the o¤er and demands a bonus  in order to
agree to continue in its current job. The rm accepts this o¤er if and only if the value
of continuing with the current worker is greater than or equal to the value of search, i.e.
if and only if  + J1  V   R: Rearranging this expression one obtains that the
rm continues to employ the worker if and only if
  e  V    R +    J1: (11)
The worker chooses the bonus  in order to maximize his expected utility from the time
of the shock onward, given by [1 F (e)] (    +W1)+F (e)U: Using (11) to substitute
for  and then (6) to substitute Z for (W1 + J1) in the expression above, the workers
o¤er solves
maxe [1  F (e)] (e   + Z   (V    R)) + F (e)U: (12)
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The rst order condition of this problem is
e K(e) =    Z + S; (13)
for all ; where K() is the inverse of the hazard rate of the distribution of . Note
that e is a function of , although we do not make this explicit in the notation.
Note also that it would be ex post e¢ cient for the worker and the rm to continue
their employment relationship whenever
   + Z  S: (14)
The presence of H(e) > 0 and K(e) > 0 in the rst order conditions (10) and (13)
implies that the rm and the worker sometimes separate when it would be e¢ cient for
them to continue their employment relationship, i.e. they separate for some  and 
that satisfy (14). This bargaining ine¢ ciency is at the heart of our analysis.
For the analysis that follows it is useful to derive an expression for the expected
match value when the rm-worker pair is hit by a shock, which we denote by Ze. Every
time a rm-worker pair is hit by a shock they jointly realize    + Z if they continue
their relationship and they jointly realize S if they separate. Thus, Ze is given by
Ze = S +
1
2
Z
2P
Z
e (   + Z   S) dG()dF ()
+
1
2
Z
2 
Z
e (   + Z   S) dF ()dG(): (15)
4.3 Steady-state Market Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium of the model without self-imposed rigidities is a tuple he;e; U; V i
that satises the rms and workers utility maximization problems in (9) and (12), re-
spectively, and equations (1) - (7) and (15).12
12A complete denition of a steady-state equilibrium in a random matching model should also include
a condition that ensures that the inows into the unemployment pool are equal to the outows from
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We start by solving for U and V . Since an unemployed worker can always drop
out of the labor market and obtain a utility equal to zero, his expected utility is the
maximum between zero and the value of search, which is given by b+ [aW0+(1 a)U ],
that is
U = max fb+  [aW0 + (1  a)U ] ; 0g : (16)
where a is the probability with which rms and workers meet a counterpart and W0 is
given in equation (1). Similarly, the value of a vacancy, V , must satisfy
V = max f c+  [aJ0 + (1  a)V ] ; 0g ; (17)
where J0 is given in equation (2).
Note that if one side of the market (e.g. workers) decides not to participate in the
labor market, then it is an optimal response for the other side (e.g. rms) to also stay out
of the market. In what follows we disregard this type of trivial equilibria with no trade
which always exist in any two-sided search model and focus on equilibria in which
both parties participate in the market. In particular, we assume that the parameters of
the model are such that there always exist equilibria in which U > 0 and V > 0.13
Adding (16) and (17) we have that the joint value of search, S0, for a rm-worker
pair who decide not to start an employment relationship satises
(1  )S0 = (b  c) + a [W0 + J0   S0] : (18)
The key to proving that the equilibrium of this model is unique is to show that there
exists a unique S0 that solves equation (18). To show this and to derive the comparative
this pool, see e.g. Pissarides (2000). However, in the present model in which workers and rms enter
the market in equal, exogenously given numbers each period and only leave unemployment in pairs,
this condition does not add any useful insight. We therefore chose to omit it from the formal deniton
of the equilibrium in order to simplify the exposition.
13For this to be the case it is su¢ cient for (b  c) and/or p to be su¢ ciently large.
17
static results that we discuss in the next section, it is useful to rst show that the gains
to continuing an employment relationship (Z   S) are decreasing in the joint value of
search S. For this purpose, we now establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The e¤ect of a marginal increase in the joint value of search S on the match
value Z is given by
dZ
dS
=
m
(1  ) + m < 1; (19)
where
m  1  1
2

E [G(e)]1 + 1
1 +H 0(e)

  E [1  F (e)]1 + 1
1 K 0(e)

: (20)
Having established this result, we can now prove that the equilibrium of our model
is unique.
Proposition 1 In the model without self-imposed rigidities, there exists a unique equi-
librium.
4.4 The E¤ects of a Reduction in the Firing Tax
We are interested in the e¤ect of a reduction in the ring tax  on the equilibrium of
the economy derived in the previous subsections. In this section our primary interest is
how such a reduction a¤ects the well being of workers and the prots of rms. We will
argue that a reduction in the ring tax leads to more aggressive bargaining behavior
between rms and workers which, in turn, leads to an increase in job instability. We
show that because of the increase in job instability some groups in society, and under
some circumstances society as a whole, can be made worse o¤.
The ring tax only a¤ects the match value Z through the joint value of search S.
This follows immediately from the denitions of Z and Ze in (7) and (15) which together
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imply that
dZ
d
=

1  (1  )
dZe
dS
dS
d
. (21)
The next lemma shows that the last term on the right hand side of (21), dS=d, is
negative, that is, that a reduction in the ring tax increases the joint value of search.
Essentially, such a reduction makes it less costly for rms and workers to separate,
simply because alternative trading partners can be found at lower cost.
Lemma 2 A reduction in the ring tax  increases the expected joint value of separation
for a rm-worker pair S, that is, dS=d < 0.
It then follows from (21) that, in order to determine the e¤ect of a change in the
ring tax  on Z, it is su¢ cient to study the sign of dZe=dS. Using (A1) and (A2) in
the proof of Lemma 1 we have that
dZe
dS
=
1   + 
1   + (1  q)

@Ze
@S
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS

; (22)
where q = (E[G(e)] + E[1  F (e)]) =2 is the expected probability of agreement. Since
q 2 [0; 1], the rst term in the right hand side of (22) is positive which implies that the
sign of dZe=dS is determined by the three terms in the parentheses. Equation (A4) in
the proof of Lemma 1 shows that the rst term is given by
@Ze
@S
= 1  q  0:
Intuitively, whenever the rm and the worker disagree, which happens with probability
(1  q), they obtain a higher payo¤ the higher is S. For given e and e his e¤ect is
unambiguously positive and represents the marginal benet of an increase in S.
The second and the third terms in brackets in (22) represent the marginal cost of an
increase in S. In particular, from the proof of Lemma 1 we know that
@Ze
@e dedS =   E [G(e)]2 (1 +H 0(e))

1  dZ
dS

 0
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and
@Ze
@e dedS =  E [1  F (e)]2 (1 K 0(e))

1  dZ
dS

 0:
Intuitively, an increase in S leads to more aggressive bargaining behavior and increases
the probability of separation, that is, it reduces e and increases e. This increase in
the probability of separation, in turn, has a negative e¤ect on the match value of a
worker-rm pair that has experienced a productivity shock, that is, it reduces Ze. It is
important to note that the negative e¤ect of an increase in the probability of separation
on the match value is due to rms and workers separating too oftenwhich, in turn,
is due to the negotiations being hampered by the presence of private information. In
a standard model in which negotiations over compensation always take place under
complete information, an increase in S also leads to more job instability; however, there
such an increase in job instability is not costly for the rm and the worker, since the
employment relationships that are discontinued have no value.
To see when a reduction in the ring tax can actually make a worker-rm pair worse
o¤, consider the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (a) Suppose that the distributions G() and F () are such that for some
 <1
min

lim
!sup 
H 0();  lim
!inf P
K 0()

 :
Then there exists an S and an S  S such that
dZ
dS
=
(
 0 if S < S
> 0 if S > S.
If the distributions do not satisfy the foregoing condition, S might not (but still can)
exist. For S  S  S, the sign of dZ=dS is ambiguous and depends on the precise
distributions of  and .
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Lemma 1 (b) Z reaches its global maximum for S > S.
This lemma is key for all the results in the paper. To get a sense for the condition
on the distributions in part (a), note rst that it rules out situations in which f() =
g() = 0, f 0() > 0 and g0() < 0, where  = sup  and  = inf P. The condition
is satised, for instance, for truncated exponential, normal and Pareto distributions as
well as for uniform distributions. To focus on the most interesting case, we assume for
the rest of the discussion that this condition is indeed satised.
The key insight of the lemma is that the negative e¤ect of an increase in S dominates
when S is small and the positive e¤ect dominates when S is large. For intermediate
values of S, the e¤ect of an increase in S on Z is ambiguous and depends on the
particular distributions of  and . The intuition for this result is as follows: when
S is initially small, it is very costly for rms and workers to separate and search for
alternative trading partners. As a result, the rm and the worker do not bargain very
aggressively with each other and separations are rare in equilibrium. Thus, the marginal
benet of an increase in S   that is, the higher payo¤ that the worker and the rm
obtain when they separate   is relatively small and is dominated by the marginal cost
  that is, the increased probability of ine¢ cient separation. When S is initially large,
however, it is not very costly for rms and workers to separate. They therefore bargain
aggressively and separate fairly often. In this case the marginal benet of an increase in
S is large and dominates the marginal cost. Finally, we note that, although an increase
in S can have a negative e¤ect on Z for low initial values of S, the global maximum of
Z is achieved at the upper limit of S.
Recall from Lemma 2 that S is decreasing in . Thus, together Lemmas 2 and 3
imply that a small reduction in ring taxes makes worker-rm pairs worse o¤ if ring
taxes are initially high and better o¤ if ring taxes are initially low. To formally state
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this and other results, it is useful to introduce the following denition.
Denition 1 Let  denote the unique  that solves S() = S, where S() is the equi-
librium value of S given . Similarly, let  denote the unique  that solves S() = S.
Note that the existence and uniqueness of  and  follow from Lemma 2. We can
now state the following proposition which summarizes the rst set of results in this
section.
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics for insiders)
(a) The e¤ect of a marginal change in  on Z is
dZ
d
=
(
 0 if  > 
< 0 if  < .
(b) The e¤ect of a marginal change in  on W0 and J0 is
dW0
d
=
dJ0
d
=
(
 0 if  > 
< 0 if  < .
(c) The e¤ect of a marginal change in  on W1 and J1 is
dW1
d
 0 if  >  and dJ1
d
 0 for all :
Part (a) of the proposition formally describes the e¤ect of a reduction in the ring
tax on the match value that was discussed above while parts (b) and (c) investigate its
e¤ect on the distribution of the match value. Part (b) shows that a reduction in ring
taxes has an adverse e¤ect on rms and workers at the beginning of an employment
relationship if ring taxes are initially high and a positive e¤ect if they are initially
low. This is again due to the two countervailing e¤ects of a reduction in the ring tax.
Finally, part (c) describes the e¤ect of a reduction in the ring tax on rms and workers
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during an employment relationship. It shows that such a reduction always increases
J1 since it improves the rms bargaining position relative to that of the worker. A
reduction in ring taxes can also be benecial for the worker when these taxes are
initially low because, although it weakens the workers bargaining position, it increases
the value of the match over which bargaining takes place.
Having discussed the e¤ect of a reduction in the ring tax on workers and rms that
are in an employment relationship, we now turn to its e¤ect on workers and rms that
are not in an employment relationship.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics Outsiders)
The e¤ects of a marginal change in  on Uand V satisfy
dU
d
=
dV
d
=
1
2
dS0
d
=
(
 0 if  > 
< 0 if  < .
For     , the sign of dU=d and dV=d are ambiguous and depend on the
distributions of  and .
Thus, even rms and workers who are currently searching for trading partners can
be made worse o¤ by a reduction in the ring tax. In particular, when ring taxes
are initially high, a tax reduction reduces the match value Z without increasing the
probability that rms and workers are matched. As a result, unemployed workers and
rms with open vacancies are made worse o¤.
So far the analysis has shown that a reduction in ring taxes can have an adverse
e¤ect on rms and workers who are already in an employment relationship and on those
who are still searching for potential trading partners. Indeed, Propositions 2 and 3
show that this reduction can make all rms and workers worse o¤. It can thus reduce
overall welfare, as shown in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4 Assume a utilitarian welfare function in which welfare is given by the
sum of the expected utilities of all rms and workers. Then a small reduction in the
ring tax reduces welfare when labor market frictions are high, that is, when   .
In summary, this section makes two main points. First, it shows that when rms and
workers bargain under asymmetric information, a reduction in the costs of separation
(e.g. a reduction in ring taxes) leads to more job instability. Second, it shows that
because of the increase in job instability, a small reduction in separation costs can make
some groups in society worse o¤ and, when separation costs are initially high, reduce
overall welfare. The adverse e¤ects of a small reduction in separation costs are, however,
dominated by its positive e¤ects when separation costs are initially low. This suggests
that labor market reforms may be harder to implement in continental Europe, where
labor market frictions are high, than in the UK or the US, where frictions are already
less severe.
It is also important to note that in our model a su¢ ciently large reduction in labor
market frictions is always welfare enhancing. In some situations, therefore, it may be
preferable to implement large reforms rather than piece-meal reforms.
4.5 Free Entry
Before we move on to analyze self-imposed rigidities in the next section, we briey
digress to discuss free entry by rms and why the main insights of the analysis above
are not a¤ected by it.14
With free entry the expected value of a vacancy, V , is equal to zero in equilibrium.
The outside option of a rm that is renegotiating the wage of an existing employee,
14A formal derivation of the results on free entry is contained in an appendix available from the
authors on request. Free entry by rms is also discussed in a previous, and slightly di¤erent, version
of our model contained in the working paper version of this article (Matouschek, Ramezzana and
Robert-Nicoud, 2004).
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however, still depends on the ring tax  that it has to pay if the employment relationship
is dissolved. Under free entry it is therefore still the case that a reduction in the ring
tax increases the joint expected value of separation S and, through this channel, leads to
more aggressive bargaining behavior and more job instability. As a result, a marginal
reduction in the ring tax reduces the match value Z and the joint value of search S0
when separation costs are initially high and it increases Z and S0 when separation costs
are initially low. Moreover, it continues to be the case that a marginal reduction in the
ring tax reduces welfare when labor market frictions are high.
Free entry therefore does not change the comparative statics on the match value and
on the joint outside options of a worker and rm that are in an employment relationship.
It does, however, change the comparative statics on the division of the surplus at the
beginning of an employment relationship. This is the case since, with free entry, the
value of a vacancy V is always equal to zero and thus una¤ected by changes in .
However, changes in  have an e¤ect on U . To see the implications of this, consider a
reduction in  when the ring tax is initially low. This reduction increases the value of
being unemployed U but does not change V . As a result, the bargaining position of
unemployed workers is strengthened and thus rms may actually be made worse o¤.
5 Self-Imposed Rigidities
In the previous sections we saw that rms and workers may sometimes fail to reach
e¢ cient agreements when they renegotiate wages. To the extent that rms and workers
anticipate this ine¢ ciency, one would expect them to take contractual actions at the
beginning of their relationship to mitigate it. In this section we investigate this pos-
sibility. We rst show that rms and workers may want to increase future separation
costs so as to commit to less aggressive bargaining behavior in the future. In other
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words, rms and workers may want to complement the exogenous rigidities that they
face with their own, self-imposed rigidities. We assume that rms and workers can
commit themselves to these self-imposed rigidities at the beginning of their relationship
even though they would prefer not to incur the extra cost when separation actually
occurs. In the real world, rms and workers commit to di¤erent separation costs in a
variety of ways. For instance, separation between a rm and a worker is less costly if
the rm uses a xed-term employment contract than if it uses a permanent contract.
In this section we study the conditions under which rms and workers choose to commit
to self-imposed rigidities and investigate the e¤ects of a reduction in ring taxes on the
optimal level of these rigidities.
In particular, we now analyze the full-edged model described in Section 2 in which
a rm and a worker that have just been matched can contract over the extra cost R that
the rm incurs in case the employment relationship is terminated in the future.15 To
simplify the exposition we now restrict attention to distributions for which H 00() is not
too positiveand K 00() is not too negative,in the sense made clear in the following
lemma. As the lemma shows, these conditions ensure that Z is everywhere convex in
S.
Lemma 4 Assume that the following conditions hold: H 00() < [1+H 0()][2+H 0()]=H()
for all  2   and K 00() > [1   K 0()]K 0()=K() for all  2 P . Then Z is everywhere
convex in S, that is, S = S.
These conditions are satised by a number of common distributions, including trun-
cated exponential and Pareto distributions as well as uniform distributions.16
15The results that we derive in this section would not change if the extra costs R were incurred not
only by the rm but also (in part or in full) by the worker.
16Slightly weaker results than those that we present in this section can be proven for more general
distributions.
26
Suppose that a rm and a worker are matched and bargain over R. Since they are
risk neutral and not liquidity constrained they agree on the level of R that maximizes
their match value Z, as given in (7). Note that in a model in which bargaining over
adjustment to productivity shocks takes place under complete information it would never
be optimal for workers and rms to commit to a strictly positive R. When bargaining
takes place under private information, however, committing to higher separation costs
may indeed be optimal, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Self-Imposed Rigidities) There exists a unique b such that
R =
(
R if   b
0 otherwise,
where
@b
@a
> 0 and
@b
@p
> 0:
The intuition for this result is as follows. On the one hand, self-imposed rigidities
make it more costly for the rm and the worker to separate, which happens with pos-
itive probability in equilibrium. On the other hand, however, precisely because these
rigidities make separation more costly, they also make it less likely, since they induce
less aggressive bargaining. When labor market frictions are initially high and/or work-
ers are very productive, the benet of self-imposed rigidities dominate the costs if labor
market frictions are large. The opposite holds if labor market frictions are small and/or
workers are not very productive.
The proposition provides a novel and intuitive explanation for why rms and workers
may commit to higher future separation costs: since rms and workers anticipate that
they may bargain too aggressivelyin the future they may nd it optimal to commit
to high separation costs in order to make the employment relationship more stable.
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The proposition also shows that if self-imposed rigidities serve this purpose, then these
self-imposed-rigidities complement exogenous rigidities: when labor market frictions are
high, in the sense that  is large, it is optimal for the rm and the worker to make it even
more costly for themselves to separate in the future by setting R as high as possible. In
contrast, when labor market frictions are low it is optimal for the rm and the worker
to avoid any additional cost of separation by setting R = 0. This result is consistent
with the observation that in countries such as Japan, in which labor market frictions
are relatively high and rms face signicant government imposed rigidities, many rms
voluntarily commit to additional constraints that make it even more costly for them to
separate from their employees.17
Finally, we can use Proposition 5 to analyze the e¤ect of a reduction in ring taxes
on the employment contracts that rms and workers adopt. For this purpose, suppose
that ring taxes are initially high, in the sense that  > b, and consider the e¤ect of
a reduction in the ring tax. If this reduction is su¢ ciently small, then the ring tax
 remains above the cut-o¤ level b and rms and workers continue to adopt the most
rigid employment contracts. If, however, the reduction is su¢ ciently large, so that
 falls below b, rms and workers switch to the most exible employment contracts,
i.e. from R = R to R = 0. This switch leads to a discrete reduction in the cost of
separation and thus induces the rms and workers to bargain more aggressively and
to separate more often following productivity shocks. The instability caused by a
reduction in ring taxes is therefore amplied by this endogenous contractual response
to the original policy change.
17See, for instance, Dore (1996) who states that What was not always recognized [...] was the
importance of self-imposed rigidities, most fully exemplied in the Japanese rm. By self-imposed
rigidities, I mean the acceptance, by managers, of a wide range of constraints on their freedom of
action - lifetime employment guarantees, tight seniority constraints on promotion, acceptance of the
need to engineer consent, to maintain close consultation with employees or their unions [...].
28
We note that the results in this section still hold if we allow for free entry of rms
along the lines of the model discussed in Section 4.5 and in the Appendix. This is
the case because the adoption of contractual rigidities discussed in the present section
depends on the joint match value Z and not on how this value is distributed between the
worker and the rm. As discussed in Section 4.5, the introduction of free entry does not
a¤ect the comparative statics on the joint match value Z and thus does not a¤ect our
conclusions about the implications of changes in ring taxes for self-imposed rigidities.
6 E¢ cient Bargaining
The model introduced in Section 3 assumed that when the rm and the worker renegoti-
ate the wage, they play a simple bargaining game in which each side makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er with probability 1/2. We assumed this particular bargaining game because
of its simplicity and because it is consistent with the standard assumption, which we
also adopted, that the rm and the worker Nash bargain over the wage when they are
rst matched. A potential concern, however, is that the results that we derived are
not robust and depend crucially on the assumed bargaining game. In this section we
address this concern. In particular, we change the model from Section 3 in two ways.
First, to simplify the exposition, we assume that each employment relationship is hit
by a shock at most once. Second, we now assume that, of all the possible bargaining
games that the rm and the worker could play when the shock hits, they play the most
e¢ cient, voluntary bargaining game, that is, the bargaining game that maximizes the
expected match value Ze, subject to the interim participation constraints.18 In other
words, we assume that at the renegotiation stage, the rm and the worker play the
18The interim participation constraints ensure that the rm and the worker are willing to participate
in the bargaining game after they have learned the realization of p and  respectively.
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Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) bargaining game. This assumption addresses the
robustness concern since the rm and the worker would commit to exactly this renegoti-
ation bargaining game if they could contract over it when they are rst matched. Also,
by assuming that the rm and the worker adopt the most e¢ cient bargaining game we
are focusing on the minimum ine¢ ciency that has to arise in a labor market in which
wage renegotiations take place in the presence of private information.
It should be stressed that the approach that we adopt in this section is very general
since we are allowing for any possible bargaining game including, for instance, alternat-
ing o¤ers games. The only restrictive assumption that we maintain is that the rm
and the worker can commit to the outcome of the renegotiation game, that is, they can
commit not to renegotiate again. Thus, if the rm and the worker disagree on a wage
they separate even if it is commonly known that there are still gains from trade. It is
important to note that if the rm and the worker were unable to commit to separate if
they disagree on a wage, the bargaining ine¢ ciency that we focus on would necessarily
be even larger. Thus, by assuming that the rm and the worker are able to commit
to separate in the case of disagreement we ensure that we are analyzing the minimum
ine¢ ciency that has to arise in a labor market in which wage renegotiations take place
in the presence of private information.19
In the formal analysis, which we relegate to the appendix, we start by following
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to describe the most e¢ cient, voluntary bargaining
game. In particular, we adopt the mechanism design approach to describe the bar-
gaining game that maximizes Ze subject to the participation constraints W ()  U
19Note also that any complete information model in which wages are determined by take-it-or-leave-it
o¤ers makes the same assumption, i.e. it assumes that if an o¤er is rejected, the rm and the worker
separate although it is commonly known that there are gains from trade (see, for instance, Pissarides
2000).
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and J()  V      R, where W () is the workers expected payo¤ from playing the
bargaining game given that his costs are  and J() is the rms expected payo¤ from
playing the bargaining game given that its benet is  (see Lemma A2 in the Appen-
dix). We then observe that as long as continuation of the employment relationship is
not always optimal, bargaining between the rm and the worker is ine¢ cient, in the
sense that they sometimes separate although it would be optimal for them to continue
their relationship. Next we establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
(see Proposition A1) and then turn to the comparative statics. We argue that, just as
in the main model, a liberalization of the labor market makes it less costly for a rm
and a worker to separate. We show that this has an ambiguous e¤ect on the match
value since, on the one hand, it increases the payo¤ they realize in case they separate
but, on the other hand, also makes separation more likely.20 The only di¤erence to
the analysis of the main model is that we are no longer able to characterize analytically
when either e¤ect dominates in the case of general distributions. However, we can show
that our results continue to hold for a number of common distributions, in particular
the standard normal, standard exponential, and standard uniform distributions. We
argue that for these distributions our main results continue to go through.
As an illustration, consider a simple numerical example in which  and  are uni-
formly distributed on [0; 1], b = c = 0, a = 1=2, p =  = 1=10, d = 5=100, r = 5=90
and  = 9=10. In this example, the optimal mechanism ensures that a rm-worker pair
that has been hit by a shock agrees to continue their relationship with probability
q(; ) =
(
1 if p    1+
1+2
(S0     1) + 1+2
0 otherwise,
where  2 [0;1): For (S0     1)   1,  = 0 and for (S0     1) >  1,  > 0
20The formal proof builds on Matouschek (2004). See Appendix for details.
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solves the interim participation constraint
E; [(2 (  ) + S0     2) q(; )] = 0:
In the appendix we show how to work out the values of all the endogenous variables for
 = f0; 0:1; :::; 1g. The results are in line with Proposition 4, namely, a reduction in
the ring tax reduces welfare when the labor market frictions are high and increases it
when they are low. Similar comparative statics hold for W0, J0, U and V , consistent
with Propositions 2 and 3. Finally, in line with Proposition 2, a reduction in the ring
tax leads to an increase in J1 and may lead to a reduction in W1.
7 Conclusions
When rms and workers bargain over compensation they are often asymmetrically in-
formed about relevant payo¤s, such as prots and the workersopportunity costs. It is
well-known that in such situations bargaining is likely to be ine¢ cient, in the sense that
rms and workers fail to realize all gains from trade. In this paper we investigate the
implications of this type of bargaining ine¢ ciency for the functioning of labor markets.
Our analysis provides three main insights. First, it shows that when bargaining
between rms and workers takes place under asymmetric information, a reduction in
separation costs leads to an increase in job instability. Essentially, such a reduction
makes it less costly for rms and workers to separate which, in turn, induces them to
bargain more aggressively. In equilibrium this leads to more job separations. Second, a
reduction in separation costs can make rms and workers worse o¤. In other words, the
increase in job instability can outweigh the direct benet of a reduction in separation
costs. Finally, our analysis shows that when wage renegotiations take place under asym-
metric information, rms and workers may nd it optimal to adopt rigid employment
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contracts that make it more costly for them to separate in the future. Moreover, a
reduction in ring taxes can lead to a one-o¤ switch from rigid to exible employment
contracts. This contractual response induces rms and workers to bargain even more
aggressively and thus further destabilizes employment relationships.
As regards the robustness of our conclusions to alternative modelling choices, we
address possible concerns that our results may depend on the assumed bargaining game
by allowing rms and workers to play the most e¢ cient bargaining game and show
that for a number of common distributions our results continue to hold. In contrast,
throughout we maintain the simplifying assumption that productivity shocks are match-
specic. We believe that it would be interesting to analyze a model in which shocks are
correlated as this would shed some light on the, possibly di¤erent, e¤ects of changes in
separation costs on high and low productivity workers and rms. We leave this analysis
for future work.
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Appendix
This appendix is divided into two sections. In Section A1 we prove all lemmas and
propositions stated in the main text and in Section A2 we allow workers and rms to
choose the most e¢ cient game when bargaining over adjustment to productivity shocks.
A1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1: Di¤erentiating (7) gives
dZ
dS
=

(1  ) + 
dZe
dS
; (A1)
where Ze is the expected match value when a shock hits. To obtain dZe=dS we totally
di¤erentiate (15):
dZe
dS
=
@Ze
@S
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS
+
@Ze
@Z
dZ
dS
: (A2)
Using this expression to substitute for dZe=dS in (A1) and solving for dZ=dS gives
dZ
dS
=

(1  ) +  (1  @Ze=@Z)

@Ze
@S
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS
+
@Ze
@~
d~
dS

: (A3)
This expression reduces to that stated in the lemma. To show this, we rst partially
di¤erentiate (15) with respect to Z and S to obtain
@Ze
@Z
= 1  @Z
e
@S
=
1
2
(E[G(e)] + E[1  F (e)]) : (A4)
Next, partially di¤erentiating (15) with respect to e and e and using the rst order
conditions for e and e given by (10) and (13) we have that
@Ze
@e = 12E [G(e)] and @Ze@e =  12E [1  F (e)] : (A5)
34
Finally, we totally di¤erentiate (10) and (13) to get
de
dS
=   1
1 +H 0(e)

1  dZ
dS

and
de
dS
=
1
1 K 0(e)

1  dZ
dS

: (A6)
Substituting (A4) - (A6) into (A3) and solving for dZ=dS then gives (19). The fact that
dZ=dS < 1 then follows from the assumptions that H 0(e) > 0 and K 0(e) < 0, which en-
sure that m 2 [ 1; 1] holds for all e() 2   and all e() 2 P, and that  < (1  )=(2).

Proof of Proposition 1: As discussed in the main text, we assume that the pa-
rameters of the model are such that equilibria with U > 0 and V > 0 always exist
and we focus on these equilibria. However, we note that even if these conditions on the
parameters did not hold, trivial equilibria with neither party participating in the market
always exist.
Noting that S = S0  R   and, from (6), that W0 + J0 = Z we can write (18) as
(1  )(S +R + ) = (b  c) + a(Z   S  R  ): (A7)
Lemma 1 implies that dZ=dS < 1 and thus that the right hand side of (A7) is de-
creasing in S. Since the left hand side of this equation is increasing in S there can only
exist a unique equilibrium value for S and thus for S0. From (18), a unique equilibrium
value for S0 implies a unique equilibrium value for (Z   S0). From (10) and (13), a
unique equilibrium value for (Z   S0) implies unique equilibrium values for e and e.
From (1), (2), (16) and (17) a unique equilibrium value for (Z   S0) implies unique
equilibrium values for U and V . 
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Proof of Lemma 2: Using S = S0    R and totally di¤erentiating (18) gives
dS
d
=   1   + a
1   + a[1  dZ=dS] < 0; (A8)
where the inequality follows from dZ=dS < 1 as shown in Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 3: We make use of the following facts: (i) dZ=dS = m=(m),
where m is given by (20) and   (1    + m)=() > 1 by m 2 [ 1; 1]. (ii) By
(20), we have m = 1 E[G(e)][2+H 0(e)]=[2+ 2H 0(e)] E[(1 F (e)][2 K 0(e)]=[2 
2K 0(e)]. (iii) By the monotone hazard rate conditions, [2 +H 0(e)] = [1 +H 0(e)] 2 [1; 2]
and [2 K 0(e)] = [1 K 0(e)] 2 [1; 2]. (iv) By (10) e is decreasing in S and by (13) e is
increasing in S.
(a) We start with the second inequality. Fact (iv) implies that for any " > 0, there
exists an S(") such that 8S > S("), G(e) < " and 1   F (e) < ". Together with facts
(ii) and (iii), we get m > 1  2". Invoking fact (i), this in turn implies
dZ
dS
=
m

>
1  2"

;
which is strictly positive if " is chosen adequately. Thus by continuity of the supports
  and P an S, as dened in the lemma, exists.
Consider next the rst inequality. Fact (iv) implies that for any  > 0 there exists an
S() such that G(e) > 1   and 1 F (e) > 1  . Next, let us impose our assumption
min flim!sup H 0();  lim!inf PK 0()g  , where  is some nite real number. In
this case, using facts (i), (ii) and (iii), we obtain m <  [1  (2+)]=(1+). Invoking
fact (i), this in turn implies
dZ
dS
=
m

<  1  (2 + )
(1 + )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which is strictly negative if  is chosen small enough. Thus by continuity of the supports
  and P an S, as dened in the lemma, exists. If our assumption above fails, that is, if
!1, then such an S might not exist.
(b) By part (a), Z grows unbounded as S increases since dZ=dS > 0 if S is large
enough. Moreover, by the fact that H() and K() are continuously di¤erentiable Z is
also a continuously di¤erentiable function of S. The result thus immediately follows. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Part (a) follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
For part (b) note rst that from (16) and (17), (1   )dU = ad(W0   U) and
(1 )dV = ad(J0 V ): Next, from (1) and (2) we haveW0 U = J0 V . Substituting
W0   U for J0   V in the foregoing equations then shows that dU = dV and hence
dU=d = dV=d. Di¤erentiating (1) and (2) and substituting dV=d for dU=d then
gives
dW0
d
=
dJ0
d
=
1
2
dZ
d
:
The signs of dW0=d and dJ0=d follow readily from part (a).
For part (c) we di¤erentiate (4) and (5) and substitute dV=d for dU=d to obtain
dW1
d
=
1
2

dZ
d
+ 1

and
dJ1
d
=
1
2

dZ
d
  1

:
Since  a¤ects Z via S only, we have
dZ
d
=
dZ
dS
dS
d
which is negative (respectively positive) if and only if dZ=dS > 0 (respectively dZ=dS <
0) by the proof of Lemma 2. Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for dW1=d to be positive
is that  > , as claimed in the text. Using (A8), we obtain
dJ1
d
=  1
2
a + (1  ) [1 + dZ=dS]
1   + a[1  dZ=dS]
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which is negative since 1 > @Z=@S >  1. 
Proof of Proposition 3: In the proof of Proposition 2 we have shown that dU=d =
dV=d. We can therefore focus on the e¤ect of a labor market liberalization on S0 =
U + V . Using S = S0    and (A8) we have that
dS0
d
=   adZ=dS
1   + a[1  dZ=dS] :
Thus, sign fdS0=dg =  sign fdZ=dSg. From Lemma 3 it then follows that dS0=d  0
if S < S and dS0=d > 0 if S > S. The signs of dU=d and dV=d then follow from
the denition of (a) and (a). 
Lemma A1 (a) In the model presented in Section 3 the unemployment rate is given by
u =

1 +
2a
2 +  fE[1 G(e)] + E[F (e)]g
 1
: (A9)
(b) The unemployment rate increases as the ring tax decreases, namely du=d < 0 for
any .
Proof: (a) This rate is computed as follows. The dynamics of the number of unemployed
workers is Nu(t+1) Nu(t) = n (a+)Nu(t)+Ne(t)fE[1 G(e)]+E[F (e)]g=2 and
the dynamics of the number of employed workers is given by Ne(t+1) Ne(t) = aNu(t) 
( + fE[1 G(e)] + E[F (e)]g=2)Ne(t). In steady state Nu(t+1) = Nu(t) = Nu and
Ne(t + 1) = Ne(t) = Ne and thus the total number of workers in the steady state is
N = Nu +Ne = n= and the unemployment rate u  Nu=N is as given in (A9).
(b) From (10) and (13), e decreases and and e increases when S increases. The
result then follows from the fact that dS=d < 0, as shown in Lemma 2. 
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Proof of Proposition 4: In steady state, welfare is given by uS0=2 + (1   u)Z=2:
Given that   (a) we know by Proposition 3 that when  decreases, unmatched
rms and workers and matched worker-rm pairs are both made worse o¤. Also, from
Lemma A1, du=d < 0 for any . Since Z > S0 it follows that those who lose their jobs
and close the job position as a result of  going down are worse o¤, too. Then the net
result of a marginal reduction in the ring tax on welfare is unambiguously negative
when labor market frictions are high to start with. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Assume that the following hold: H 00() < [1+H 0()][2+H 0()]=H()
for all  and that K 00() > [1 K 0()]K 0()=K() for all . Next, consider
d2Z
dS2
=

1  dZ
dS


2(1  (1  m)) 24Z
2P

H(e)H 00(e)
(1 +H 0(e))2   2 +H 0(e)1 +H 0(e)

de
dS
g(e)dF ()
+
Z
2 

K(e)K 00(e)
(1 K 0(e))2   K 0(e)1 K 0(e)

de
dS
f(e)dG()
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Since dZ=dS < 1, de=dS < 0 and de=dS > 0, we have that Z is convex in S for all S
as long as H 00() and K 00() obey the restrictions above. 
Proof of Proposition 5: We rst argue that Z is quasi-convex in R. To see this note
rst that Z depends on R only through S. Thus, dZ=dR = (@Z=@S)(dS=dR): Next
note that a change in  has the same e¤ect on S as a change in R, i.e. dS=d = dS=dR.
Since we have shown in Lemma 2 that dS=d < 0 it follows that dS=dR < 0. Thus,
dZ=dR = 0 if and only if @Z=@S = 0: This, in turn, implies that at any R for which
dZ=dR = 0, the second derivative is given by d2Z=dR2 = (@2Z=@S2)(dS=dR)2 > 0;
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where the inequality follows from the convexity of Z in S (by Lemma 4). Thus, any
interior extremum of Z is a minimum so that Z is quasi-convex in R.
Since Z is quasi-convex in R it can only be maximized by either R = 0 or R = R.
Let 
(R) be the equilibrium value of Z when the self-imposed rigidities take the value
R: Then, R = R is optimal if and only if 
(R)   
(0)  0 and R = 0 is optimal
otherwise.
To show the rst part of the proposition, namely that there exists a unique b(p)
such that R = R is optimal if   b(a; p) and R = 0 is optimal otherwise, we only need
to show that if 
(R) 
(0) = 0, then 
(R) 
(0) is increasing in . To see that this
is indeed the case note rst that
d(
(R)  
(0))
d


(R) 
(0)=0
=
@
(R)
@S
dS(R)
d
  @
(0)
@S
dS(0)
d
: (A10)
Note next that because 
(R) is quasi-convex in R, it must be the case that if 
(R)  

(0) = 0, then
d
(R)
dR
=
@
(R)
@S
dS(R)
dR
> 0 and
d
(0)
dR
=
@
(0)
@S
dS(0)
dR
< 0:
Since, as shown above, dS=dR < 0 for all R, it follows that @
(R)=@S < 0 and
@
(0)=@S > 0 if 
(R) 
(0) = 0. This, together with the observation that dS=d < 0
for all R, implies that the expression in (A10) is positive, which proves our claim.
Finally, to see that b(a; p) is increasing in a we only need to show that if 
(R)  

(0) = 0, then 
(R) 
(0) is decreasing in a. To see that this is indeed the case note
that
d(
(R)  
(0))
da


(R) 
(0)=0
=
@
(R)
@S
dS(R)
da
  @
(0)
@S
dS(0)
da
: (A11)
We have just shown that if (
(R) (0)) = 0, then @
(R)=@S < 0 and @
(0)=@S > 0.
This, together with the observation that dS=da > 0 for all R, implies that the expression
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in (A11) is negative if (
(R)  
(0)) = 0. The comparative statics for p can be shown
in a similar manner. 
A2 E¢ cient Bargaining
In this section we analyze the model described in Section 6. Most of the analysis in
Section 4.1. still goes through. In particular,W0 is still given by (1) and J0 is still given
by (2). The expected utility W1 of a worker who formed an employment relationship
in the past and has not yet been hit by the shock is given by (4) and the corresponding
expected value of a rm J1 is given by (5). Since we are assuming that the shock only
hits once, we must now also specify the expected utility of an employed worker after a
shock has hit, W2, and the value of a rm with a lled vacancy after a shock has hit,
J2. These values are given by respectively by (4) and (5) for  = 0, in which case
Z = p=(1  ) by (7).
Next, we need to reconsider the analysis in Section 4.2. To describe the bargaining
solution of the bargaining game that takes place when a rm and a worker have been hit
by a shock, we can apply the Revelation Principle which allows us to restrict the analysis,
without loss of generality, to Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Suppose
then that, after having learned  and , the rm and the worker make announcements
b and b. A direct mechanism species the probability of trade q(b;b) and expected
adjustment bonus (b;b) as a function of these announcements. The bargaining game
maximizes the match value subject to the interim participation constraints. Thus, it is
described by the solution to
max
q(); ()
Ze = S + E;p [(   +W2 + J2   S) q(; )] (A12)
subject to the interim participation and incentive compatibility constraints, where Z2 
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(W2 + J2).21 Note that Z2 and S do not depend on  and  and can therefore be
treated as constants. The following lemma follows immediately from Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and describes the optimal trading rule that solves the maximization
problem (A12).
Lemma A2 The optimal trading rule that solves maximization problem (A12) is given
by
q(; ) =
(
1 if p   + Z2   S  1+ (H() +K())
0 otherwise,
where  2 [0;1). For S   Z2  inf P   sup ,  = 0 and for S   Z2 > inf P   sup ,
 > 0 solves the interim participation constraint
E; [(   + Z2   S  K() H()) q(; )] = 0: (IR)
Proof: This lemma follows immediately from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
we refer to their analysis. 
Thus, even if the rm and the worker play the most e¢ cient bargaining game, bar-
gaining is ine¢ cient if S   Z2 > inf P   sup . Essentially, as long as continuation of
the employment relationship is not optimal for all  and , the rm and the worker
sometimes separate although it would be e¢ cient for them to continue the employment
relationship.
Having described the bargaining game at the renegotiation stage, we can proceed
and close the model by solving for U and V as in Section 4.3. The equations (16) - (18)
still hold and we can use them to show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
of the model.
21The incentive compatibility constraints ensure that each manager nds it optimal to make truthful
announcements of his or her type and the interim individual rationality constraints ensure that, after
learning their type, the agents prefer participating in the bargaining game to realizing the disagreement
payo¤s.
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Proposition A1 (Equilibrium) The equilibrium of the model exists and is unique.
Proof: The proof is similar to that in Proposition 1. We only need to show that with
the di¤erent bargaining that we now assume it is still the case that dZ=dS < 1 as shown
in Lemma 1. We can use Lemma A3 and (7) and apply the envelope theorem to get
dZ
dS0
=

1  (1  ) f(1  E;p[q(; )])  E;p [q(; )]g  1. (A13)
For the rest of the proof we refer to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Next we need to reconsider the analysis in Sections 4.4. Lemma 2 still goes through
since its proof does not depend on the assumed bargaining game; indeed, the key step
in that lemma requires dZ=dS to be smaller than unity, which holds by (A13). Thus,
it is still the case that a reduction in the ring tax increases S and therefore makes it
less costly for rms and workers to separate. The e¤ect of such a reduction on Z is
also the same as in the main model. In particular, on the one hand, a reduction in the
ring tax makes it less costly for rms and workers to separate, which tends to increase
Z, but on the other hand, it also increases the probability of disagreement, which tends
to reduce Z. To see this formally consider (A13). The rst term in the squared
brackets represents the positive e¤ect of a marginal increase in S: the rm and the
worker realize a higher payo¤ whenever they disagree, which happens with probability
(1  E;[q(; )]). The second term represents the costs of a marginal increase in
S: the probability of agreement is reduced since the participation constraint is more
binding.
In contrast to the main model, we can no longer characterize analytically when either
of the two e¤ects dominates for general distributions. In other words, we can no longer
prove something as general as Lemma 3. We can, however, show that for a number of
common distributions our key results still hold.
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Lemma A3 Suppose that the distributions of  and  are either the standard normal,
standard exponential, or standard uniform distributions. Then Z is quasi-convex in S,
has an interior minimum, and reaches its global maximum as S goes towards its upper
limit.
Proof: This follows from Proposition 3 and Footnote 17 in Matouschek (2004). 
For these common distributions all the results in Sections 4.4 and 5 then continue
to hold. In particular, the proofs of Propositions 2 - 5 still go through.
Finally, we turn to the numerical example described in Section 6. Note rst that
for this example Z2 = 1. It then follows from Lemma A3 that a rm-worker pair that
is hit by a shock continues its relationship with probability
q(; ) =
(
1 if p    1+
1+2
(S0     1) + 1+2
0 otherwise,
(A14)
where  2 [0;1): For (S0     1)   1,  = 0 and for (S0     1) >  1,  > 0
solves the interim participation constraint
E; [(2 (  ) + S0     2) q(; )] = 0: (A15)
Substituting Ze = fS + E;p [(   + 1  S) q(; )]g into (7) gives
Z =
p+  fS + E;p [(   + 1  S) q(; )]g
1  (1  ) : (A16)
We can use equations (18) and (A14) - (A16) to solve for , S0 and Z. Equations (1) -
(5) can then be used to solve for W0, J0, W1 and J1. Finally, equations (16) and (17)
give U and V .
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shock hits
shock does
not hit
firm and worker
negotiate over
‘adjustment bonus’
firm and worker
negotiate wage
and produce
first period
upon matching
subsequent periods
firm and worker
renegotiate wage
and produce
firm and worker
renegotiate wage
and produce
Figure 1: Timing
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